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Hylin v. United States: Can the Mine
Safety and Health Administration do
no Wrong?
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Tort Claims Act [hereinafter FTCA]1 provides
that the United States may be liable for injuries caused by the
negligent acts or omissions of government employees "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances." 2 The FTCA does not waive immunity
in all respects; Congress was careful to except several important
classes of tort claims. 3 Of particular relevance is the discretionary
function exception 4, which precludes liability for the exercise of
discretionary governmental functions.'
Prior to Supreme Court ruling in United States v. S. A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)6 [here-
inafter Varig], federal courts which interpreted the discretionary
function exception typically imposed liability on the United States
for negligence in the implementation of a program, but not for
the creation of a program.7 In light of this distinction, federal
courts have characterized the actions of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration8 pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1982);
see infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
2 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
3 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982); see infra note 21 and accompanying text.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). For the full text, see infra note 22.
1 Id.
6 467 U.S. 797 (1984), rev'g, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982). United States v. S.
A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir.
1982) [hereinafter Varig], and United States v. United Scottish Ins., 692 F.2d 1209 (9th
Cir. 1982) [hereinafter United Scottish], were consolidated by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court decision will be referred to and cited as Varig.
See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
30 U.S.C. § 811 (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 1.1-1.3 (1986).
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Health Act9 as nondiscretionary insofar as its conduct consists
primarily of implementing and enforcing mandatory safety reg-
ulations. 10
In Varig, the Supreme Court broadened the scope of the
discretionary function exception, holding in part that the "dis-
cretionary function exception encompasses all discretionary acts
of government when it regulates the conduct of private individ-
uals."" Interpreting Varig, many federal courts have expanded
the discretionary function exception to include almost any neg-
ligent operational act 12 performed by a regulatory agency.' 3
In Hylin v. United States, 4 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit applied the Varig decision to the Mine Enforce-
ment and Safety Administration [hereinafter MSHAJ for the
first time."5 In Hylin, the court held "that under Varig Airlines,
the enforcement activities of MESA inspectors are protected by
9 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982); see infra note 94. The Act repealed and replaced
the Federal Metal and Nonmetalic Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 721 et. seq. (1976).
For the purposes and scope of this Comment, both acts will be treated as principally
the same. Federal courts have held that inspections under the Mine Safety and Health
Act and the Metal and Nonmetalic Safety Act fall within the discretionary function.
Russell v. United States, 763 F.2d 786, 787 (10th Cir. 1985).
10 Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated and
remanded, 105 S. Ct. 65 (1984), rev'd, 755 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
Varig, 467 U.S. at 813-14.
' For a distinction between operational level and planning level acts, see infra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Proctor v. United States, 781 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the Federal Aviation Administration's negligence in an actual inspection of an aircraft
is protected by the discretionary function exception); Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d
1059 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that the failure of the Public Health Service to warn
workers of known radiation dangers was protected by the discretionary function excep-
tion); Totten v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) .(holding that Air
Force personnel who approved post accident cleanup operation following MX2 rocket
test failure, which plan did not comply with military safety regulations, were protected
by the discretionary function exception).
" Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded,
469 U.S. 807 (1985), rev'd, 755 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curium). The Hylin decision
involved an inspection by the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration pursuant to
the Metal and Nonmetalic Mine Safety Act. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
became effective after the accident that gave rise to the suit in Hylin. Hylin, 755 F.2d
at 554, n.3. The inspection duties of the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration
are now performed by the Mine Safety and Health Administration. See note 9.
11 The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act became effective only after the accident
that gave rise to this suit. Hylin, 755 F.2d at 554, n.3. MESA inspectors are now referred
to as MSHA inspectors.
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the discretionary function exception.' '1 6 This comment examines
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hylin and prior decisions of
the federal courts in order to assess whether the Seventh Circuit
has read the Varig opinion too broadly and consequently com-
pletely immunized the actions of MSHA.
I. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION
In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act 7 as
a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity for
certain types of specified tortious acts of federal agents.' The
FTCA's legislative history indicates an intent to waive immunity
for torts committed by federal agents within the scope of their
duty. 19 The FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity reflects a
congressional sentiment that the United States Government has
a legal responsibility for its negligent conduct.
20
,6 Id. at 554.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) authorizes suits against the United States for dam-
ages:
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act occurred.
Id.
,8 Id. An individual asserting a claim against a United States employee must follow
the provisions outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982).
11 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27-28 (1949). In Dalehite, the Supreme
Court provided an extensive analysis of the FTCA's scant legislative history. The Court
concluded:
The legislative history indicates that . . . Congress desired to waive the
Government's immunity from actions for injuries to person and property
occassioned by the tortious conduct of its agents acting within their scope
of business . . . [u]ppermost in the collective mind of Congress were the
ordinary common-law torts.
Id. Prior to the FTCA, tort victims of actions by federal employees had to seek relief
through a Congressional private bill waiving soveriegn immunity. Downs v. United
States, 522 F.2d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 1975). The purpose of the FTCA was to relieve
Congress of this burden by entrusting the courts with the responsibility. Id., citing
United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1963); Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24-25; Larson
v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703-04 (1949).
" See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House on the House Committee on
Claims on a General Tort Bill, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1932) (discussing scope of
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The FTCA imposes a number of particular limits on the
waiver. 2t The most significant restriction is the discretionary
function exception. 2 2 This exception is premised on the rationale
that certain governmental activities are either legislative or ex-
ecutive in nature; hence, judicial control of these activities through
tort suits would harm the balanced separation of powers. 23 The
judiciary should be prevented from interfering with certain kinds
of executive branch functions. 24 Limiting this interference and
control is the purpose of the discretionary function exception.
25
The courts have struggled in determining whether the discretion-
ary function exception should be extended to include the negli-
gence of government employees who implement discretionary
governmental activities .26
proposed torts act). The federal courts are directed to follow the tort law of the state
where the tort occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Hence, the issue of federal liability is
largely dependent upon state tort doctrines.
2j Some procedural limits include: 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (vesting jurisdiction exclu-
sively in federal district courts); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675 (1982) (claim must first be
presented to administrative agency allegedly responsible). For substantive limits, see 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (1982).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Section 2680(a) provides:
The provision of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to: any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id.
23 Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1170-71 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The
policy behind the discretionary function exception is to prevent the courts from using
tort actions as "a vehicle for judicial interference with decisionmaking that is properly
exercised by other branches of the government .... . .. Id. at 1170. The FTCA's
legislative history indicates that the discretionary function exception was designed to
embody the separation of powers theory. Id.; see also Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163
(discretionary function exception protects the Government from liability that "would
seriously handicap efficient government operations"); Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 32 (Congress
was careful to protect the Government from claims that would impede governmental
functions).
Blessing, 447 F. Supp. at 1170. "Statutes, regulations, and discretionary func-
tions . . . are, as a rule, manifestations of policy judgments made by the political
branches. In our tripartite governmental structure, the courts generally have no substan-
tive part to play in such decisions." Id.
25 For an excellent analysis of discretion as it applies to federal agencies, see
Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion", 57 Tul. L. Rev 776 (1983).
1 See Harrison and Kolezynski, Government Liability for Certification of Air-
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II. THE HYLIN DECISION
Hylin v. United States 27 involved a mine inspection and the
enforcement of a safety standard by MESA pursuant to the
Federal Metal and Nonmetalic Mine Safety Act. 28 In Hylin,
inspectors enforced a mandatory safety standard requiring mine
conveyors to be equipped with handrails or emergency stop
devices. 29 The inspectors issued an order for the construction of
conveyor handrails;30 as a result, mine employees were forced to
walk dangerously close to a defective junction box.31 MESA
inspectors had not scrutinized the box's condition even though
they had observed its dangerous state.12 Moreover, the inspectors
knew that the placement of the handrails would foreclose the
miners' preferred route -- forcing passage near the hazardous
junction box."
craft?, 44 J. Air L. & Com. 23, 34 (1978). For the purpose of this comment the issue
should be framed as whether the discretionary function exception should be extended to
include the negligence of MSHA inspectors implementing safety regulations pursuant to
the Mine Safety and Health Act.
27 715 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 469 U.S. 807 (1985),
rev'd, 755 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curium).
n Id. The Federal Metal and Nonmetalic Mine Safety Act was repealed in 1977
and replaced by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act. See supra note 9.
Hylin, 715 F.2d at 1208-09 (MSHA inspectors cited the mine for violating 30
C.F.R. § 55.9-7, which requires that all conveyors have handrails or emergency stop
devices.).
30 Id. at 1215. The mine operator could have installed an emergency stop device
or the handrail. Id. The construction of an emergency stop device, however, "was not
feasible, given the nature of the mine's continuous operation, and . . . the inspectors
were aware of this fact." Id. The inspectors knew that the mine operator's response to
the order "would be to install the handrails and that the result of this installation would
be to redirect worker ingress through a narrow passageway past the junction box ....
Id. at 1216.
1, Id. at 1208. One of the purposes of the handrail (also referred to as "barrier")
is to prevent workers from crossing over the conveyor belt. Hylin, 715 F.2d at 1215. As
a result of the handrail implementation, workers were forced "to walk down the left
side of the belt and to pass by the faulty junction box." Id.
32 Id. at 1208. The junction box was not inspected even though the inspectors had
noticed its dangerous condition. Id. The cover of the box lacked effective means to keep
it closed, the wires entering the box were inadequately insulated, and a short circuit or
ground fault had caused two holes in the cover of the box. Id.
11 Id. at 1209. At the time of the inspection, the MESA inspectors were aware
that employees customarily traversed along the west side of the conveyor and crossed
the conveyor on the way to an incline ramp. Hylin, 715 F.2d at 1209. This route was
preferred to the other because it was wider and not obstructed by the dangerous junction
box. Id.
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While following this newly necessitated route, the plaintiff's
decedent was electrocuted by the junction box.3 4 The plaintiff
sued the United States under the FTCA for alleged negligence
of MESA inspectors.3" The action was premised on Section
324A(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts;a6 that is, the
inspectors' decision to implement handrails had increased the
risk of injury from the defective junction box.
37
Hylin presented two main issues for the Seventh Circuit:
first, whether state law would recognize a cause of action if
MESA inspectors were private citizens;3" and second, whether
the plaintiff's claim was barred by the discretionary function
exception. 39 The court held that a valid cause of action existed
4
0
and that the claim was not barred by the exception.41 The court
opined that the MESA inspectors' conduct was not discretionary 42
inasmuch as it consisted primarily of implementing and enforcing
mandatory regulations .
4
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Hylin
decision" for reconsideration in light of its ruling in Varig.45 The
only issue considered on remand was whether the discretionary
function exception, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
' Id. at 1209.
I Id. at 1208. The issuance of the inspector's order was mandatory pursuant to
30 C.F.R. § 55.9-7. Id. at 1213. The plaintiff did not claim that the issuance of this
order was negligence. Rather, "the inspectors' negligence was in failing to consider the
consequences of their action. The MESA [now MSHA] Inspection and Investigation
Manual instructs that [ain inspector shall consider his action during the inspection and
shall not create a dangerous situation in enforcing compliance with a standard." Id. at
1214.
36 Hylin, 715 F.2d at 1210.
37 Id.
36 Id. at 1209.
19 Id. at 1213.
I Id. at 1210; see infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
41 Hylin, 715 F.2d at 1214.
42 Id. The court relied heavily on Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955) in its ruling. Id. For discussion of Indian Towing, see infra notes 62-66 and
accompanying text.
41 Hylin, 715 F.2d at 1214. The court stated: "[tihe great weight of authority
suggests that where, as here, the disputed conduct consists of merely implementing and
enforcing mandatory regulations, the requisite halo of policy-making is not present."
Id.
Hylin, 469 U.S. 807.
41 Hylin, 755 F.2d at 552.
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Varig, barred the plaintiff's claim. 46 The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded: [i]f the regulatory inspection and enforcement activities
of an agency require its employees to exercise discretion in
performing their duties, the discretionary function exception bars
tort claims against the government based upon those perform-
ances. 47 Based on this analysis, the court reversed its previous
holding and resolved that the discretionary exception barred the
plaintiff's action in Hylin.
48
III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION
A. Cases Prior to Varig
Prior to Varig, courts which interpreted the discretionary
function exception often distinguished between acts of the fed-
eral government at the "planning" level from acts at the "op-
erational" level.4 9 Acts at the planning stage involve policy
considerations of future effects on a large number of people,
hence they fall within the exception.50 Acts undertaken to imple-
46 Id.
17 Id. at 553.
41 Id. at 554. In order to fully understand and evaluate the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Hylin, a summary of the Varig and pre-Varig cases is necessary. As a
precautionary note, the scope of this comment requires a simplified treatment of the
Varig and pre-Varig cases. For a more detailed analysis, see, e.g., Plave, The Supreme
Court Narrows the Scope of Government Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
51 J. Air L. & Com. 197 (1985); Corrigan, Federal Tort Claims Act - U.S. Not Liable
for Negligence in Certificating Aircraft for Use in Commercial Aviation, 10 Air.L. 106
(1985); Young, FAA Safety Check Falls Under the Tort Claims Exception, 70 A.B.A.J.
172 (1984).
11 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1967), cert denied,
389 U.S. 841 (1967); White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1963); United States
v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1962); Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819,
823 (8th Cir. 1956); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Conn. 1965).
10 In Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion," 57 TUL. L. REV. 776, 813
(1983), Professor Rogers suggests that the legislative history of the FTCA indicates that
the focus for applying the discretionary function exception is "whether the claim is more
appropriately resolved in a tort suit for damages, than in an APA [Administrative
Procedure Act] suit for judicial review of agency action." The author explained this
distinction as follows:
Some [government decisions], by their nature, are best examined in the
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ment and enforce such plans [operational level] do not fall within
the exception inasmuch as there are no policy considerations of
future effect; rather, operational acts are one-time actions or
inactions which can only be reviewed after the fact.5
Two leading Supreme Court decisions which developed the
foundation of the planning/operational distinction are Dalehite
v. United States 12 and Indian Towing v. United States.s3 In
Dalehite, the Federal Government shipped an explosive fertilizer
into a populated area.m The fertilizer subsequently caught fire
and exploded, causing numerous deaths.55 Holding for the gov-
ernment, the Court stated that the discretionary function excep-
tion "includes determinations made by executives or
administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules
of operations. ' 5 6 Moreover, the Court concluded that the excep-
context of a tort suit [as opposed to judicial review under the APA]. If
the government activity or choice is of immediate effect and cannot be
challenged until it is executed, judicial review is not a satisfactory means
for the courts to check the executive. Instead, tort suits for damages provide
the means for judicial control of acts of government employees. For
example, the decision to employ or not to employ navigation aids by the
Coast Guard applies to the future, affects numerous people, and accord-
ingly can be reviewed for legality or abuse of discretion only under the
APA: it is the exercise of a "discretionary function." The negligent main-
tenance of a particular aid, however, shares none of those characteristics.
It is instead a one-time action or inaction, which can be reviewed only
after the fact. Thus, there should be no tort immunity for such a particular
negligent act because the purpose of the discretionary function exception
does not apply.
Id. at 817 (footnotes omitted).
51 Since most acts of planning involve public policy considerations of future effect
and affect large numbers of people, the planning/operational distinction will serve the
purposes of the discretionary function exception-as long as courts do not lose sight of
the underlying basis of the exception. Id.
52 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (holding that the United States was not liable for damages
arising out of an explosion because the certification process leading to the explosion was
discretionary and the negligence occurred at the policy making level).
53 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (fimding that the United States was liable under the FTCA
for the Coast Guard's negligence in operating a lighthouse because the negligence was
operational inasmuch as it did not involve policy making discretion).
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 22-23.
' Id. at 23.
56 346 U.S. at 35-36. In Dalehite, the government developed a plan to produce
fertilizer for a war-torn Europe and the Orient. Id. at 19-22. Prior to being shipped
overseas, an extremely explosive fertilizer was stored in large quantities in Texas City,
Texas. Id. at 22-23. Subsequently, the fertilizer caught fire and the ships exploded-
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tion extends to "acts of subordinates" in planning and carrying
out high level policy decisions in accordance with official direc-
tions .
7
The Dalehite definition of the planning level is vague.5" The
opinion suggests a limited construction of discretion 9 yet the
holding reflects an expansive view, 6° extending the exception to
almost any act of the government involving judgment. 61
In Indian Towing v. United States,62 the Court attempted to
further define the limits of the descretionary function excep-
tion.63 In Indian Towing, the United States Coast Guard negli-
leveling much of the city and resulting in numerous deaths. Id. at 23. The Plaintiffs
alleged that the government was negligent by knowingly creating a fertilizer with an
explosive chemical make-up and shipping this explosive fertilizer into a populated area
without adequate investigation or warning. Id. The Supreme Court held that the gov-
ernment was not liable for damages as a result of the fertilizer program, reasoning that
the government decisions were made at the planning level. Id. at 42.
51 Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36. The Court went on to hold that "[w]here there is
room for policy judgment and decision, there is discretion." Id. The breadth of this
statement has confused courts in determining how far the exception should extend. See
infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
" See Blessing, 447 F. Supp. at 1172-76 (discussing the unclear and confusing
lower court decisions resulting from the Dalehite case).
59 In Dalehite, the Court noted that certain policy decisions resulting in the gov-
ernment's liability were important to the functioning of the government's fertilizer
program. 346 U.S. at 42. The Court distinguished agency decisions critical to the
government programs from less critical decisions. Id. at 43. This distinction reflects a
focus of inquiry on the nature of the decison making itself, rather than who is making
the decision. Such a focus provides a narrow application of the discretionary function
exception. See Blessing, 447 F. Supp. at 1174.
6 The Court held that the government's negligent labeling of fertilizer bags was
discretionary. Therein lies the difficulty in reconciling the court's language with its
holding: it is hard to visualize how the labeling decision was truly critical to the overall
practicability of the government program or how labeling depended on policy consid-
erations. Blessing, 447 F. Supp. at 1174 n. 21; see also Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 47-60
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the initial decision to implement the fertilizer
program should have been considered a discretionary function and not the negligent acts
of those responsible for carrying out the details).
61 Any governmental or regulatory act arguably involves judgment. Most opera-
tions retain some planning elements until final execution. Blessing, 447 F. Supp. at 1173
n. 19.
62 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
63 Id. In Indian Towing, the plaintiff suffered economic loss when his tugboat ran
aground. Id. at 62. The United States Coast Guard failed to properly maintain the
lighthouse or warn seamen of its inoperation. Id. The court found that the significant
inquiry for application of the discretionary function exception was whether a private
person would be liable for negligence in similar circumstances. Id. at 68-69. Interestingly,
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gently operated a lighthouse which resulted in a ship running
aground. 64 Holding for the injured plaintiff, the Court opined
that if the government decides to provide a discretionary service,
then it must provide the service Wvith due care. 65 The opinion
suggests that the failure of a federal agency to correctly perform
a mandatory function is an operational level act and not within
the discretionary exception. 66
After Indian Towing, courts uniformly applied the planning/
operational distinction as the detetminative test for application
of the discretionary function exception. 67 When assessing the
nature of the government's discretion, however, the focus often
centered on the status of the employee involved rather than the
nature of the conduct. 68 Thus, courts applying the planning/
operational distinction were beginning to stray from the purpose
of the discretionary function- exception. 69
the government conceded that the actual operation of the lighthouse did not involve
discretion. Id. at 64. The government argued that the language of the FTCA implies
that activities which a private person could not perform [governmental activities] are
excluded from liability. Id. The Court rejected this contention because there was no
support in the legislative history. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 67.
Id. at 62.
63 Id. at 69. The Court emphasized the public's reliance on the Coast Guard's
operation of the lighthouse. Id. Moreover, this reliance creates a duty to properly
maintain and operate the lighthouse. Id.
Interpreting Indian Towing, federal courts have gleaned this characterization.
See, e.g., Madison v. United States, 679 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding negligent
enforcement of safety regulations governing manufacture of ammunition as operational
and not within the discretionary exception); Loge v. United States, 662 F.2d 1268 (8th
Cir. 1981) (holding the disregard of mandatory regul~tions-governing polio vaccine
licensing as operational); Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967)
(finding the disregard of air traffic control regulations as operational), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 931 (1967).
1, See supra note 49.
61 See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 76-77 (D.C. Cir.
1955), 'bff'd sub nom., United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
-9 The planning/6perational distinction serves the purpose of the discretionary
function exception as long as its application remains consistent with the underlying basis
for the exception. See supra notes 52-55 and -accotipanying text. Since most acts of
planing involve public policy considerations, are of future effect, and affect large
numbers of people, this distinction serves the purpose of the discretionary function
exception. However, when courts focns on the status of the actor-not the acts them-
selves-they lose sight of the distinction.
HYLIN & MSHA v. U.S.
B. The Varig Decision
The Supreme Court broadened the applicability of the dis-
cretionary function exception in United States v. S. A. Empresa
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)70 and its com-
panion case7' United States v. Scottish Insurance Co.72 Varig
and United Scottish involved claims of negligence in the certifi-
cation and inspection of aircrafts by the Federal Aviation
Administration [hereinafter FAA] . 7 In Varig, a commerical air-
craft crashed due to the smoke and fire resulting from an unex-
tinguished cigarette being placed in a lavatory trash receptacle.
74
In United Scottish, a faulty cabin heater caused a commercial
aircraft to catch fire in midair and crash. 75 In both cases, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and held that
the discretionary function exception shielded the FAA from
liability76 -- even though proper enforcement of FAA regulations
could have prevented both fires.
77
The Supreme Court treated Varig and United Scottish as
factually parallel; 7 however, significant factual differences ex-
isted. In United Scottish the FAA actually inspected the aircraft
heater, 79 but in Varig the FAA made a decision not to inspect
the lavatory. 0 Hence, United Scottish involved an actual inspec-
tion that did not reveal safety defects, while Varig involved a
70 467 U.S 797 (1984).
7, Id. The Supreme Court joined these two cases because both concerned claims
that the FAA approved unworthy aircraft for flight. Id. at 799-804.
7" 467 U.S. 797 (1984). In United Scottish, a commercial aircraft caught fire in
mid-air and crashed because of a faulty heater. Id. at 802. The Court reversed the lower
court's decision and held that the FAA's negligence was within the discretionary function
exception and thus the United States was protected from liability. Id. at 804-21.
71 Id. at 799.
74 S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v. United
States, 692 F.2d 1205, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
7 United Scottish Ins. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1979), affid,
692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1984), fev'd, 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
76 Varig, 467 U.S. at 821.
77 Varig, 692 F.2d at 1208; United Scottish, 614 F.2d at 190.
7s Varig, 467 U.S. at 815. The court treated both cases as actions premised on
"the negligent failure of the FAA to inspect certain aspects of aircraft type design in
the process of certification ..... " Id.
71 United Scottish, 614 F.2d at 190.
w Varig, 16 Av. Case (CCH) 17577, 17585-87 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 1981).
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decision not to inspect. The Court did not discuss this factual
distinction and treated both cases as claims challenging the FAA's
decision not to inspect
s.8
In Varig, the Court's analysis of Dalehite and its progeny
failed to mention or repudiate the planning/operational distinc-
tion, indicating a dissatisfaction with the judicial development
of the distinction.8 2 The opinion rejected the Indian Towing
discretionary function analysis as irrelevant. 3 Refusing to define
the precise contours of the discretionary function exception, 4
the Court emphasized that federal courts should focus on the
legislative history of the FTCA to infer "whether the challenged
acts of a Government employee . . . are of the nature and
quality that Congress intended to shield from tort liability.' '85
After reviewing the legislative history of the FTCA, the
Supreme Court articulated two broad principles useful in deter-
mining when the discretionary function will protect the acts of
government employees from liability.1 First, "it is the nature of
the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs
whether the discretionary function exception applies." 87 Hence,
"the basic inquiry . . . is whether the challenged acts of a
Government employee -- whatever his or her rank -- are of the
nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort
liability." 8 8 Second, the exception "was intended to encompass
the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a
regulator of the conduct of private individuals.
' 8 9
9, Varig, 467 U.S. at 815.
82 The Varig opinion never mentioned the planning/operation distinction even
though it had been judicially recognized for over thirty years. See supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text. The Court's omission can be read as judicial abandonment of those
cases that developed the distinction.
83 Varig, 467 U.S. at 811-12.
" Id. at 813.
I /d.
86 Id. at 807-15.
87 Id. at 813. The Court cited Dalehite for this proposition, stating that "the
exception covers '[nlot only agencies of government . . . but all employees exercising
discretion."' Id.
88 Vaig, 467 U.S. at 813. The opinion's specific reference to "whatever his or her
rank" reflects a repudiation of the development of the planning/operational distinction
which often centered its focus on the status of the employee rather than the nature of
his conduct. See supra notes 68, 69 and accompanying text.
89 Varig, 467 U.S. at 814. The Court analyzed legislative history and concluded
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The Varig opinion is confusing. 90 Applying the aforemen-
tioned principles, the Court focused exclusively on the issue of
the alleged negligence of the FAA in failing to inspect an aircraft
in the certification process. 91 In addition to failing to address
the planning/operational distinction, the Court did not consider
that:
Congress wished to prevent judicial "second-guessing" of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
through the medium of an action in tort. By fashioning an exception for
discretionary governmental functions, including regulatory activities, Con-
gress took "steps to protect the Government from liability that would
seriously handicap efficient government operations." United States v. Muniz,
374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963).
Id. The Court's analysis demonstrates a concern for the aformentioned purpose of the
discretionary exception. See supra notes 21-26, 49-51 and accompanying text.
'o See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (following
a MX2 rocket test failure, Air Force personnel who approved a post accident cleanup
operation plan, which did not comply with military safety regulations, were held pro-
tected by the discretionary function exception). But see Valley Towing Service v. United
States, 609 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (court stated that the discretionary
function exception applied to the Government's decision to erect navigational aids; but
when the decision to construct such aids has been made, the Government can be liable
for negligently maintaining those structures). Many federal courts have focused on the
Supreme Court's regulatory/nonregulatory language, applying the discretionary function
exception to almost any negligent act of regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Begay v. United
States, 768 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Public Health Service's
failure to warn workers of radiation dangers was a regulatory type of service and
protected by the discretionary function exception); Heller v. United States, 620 F. Supp.
270, 272 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (holding that the medical licensing authority of the FAA is a
role where the government is acting as a regulator of private conduct and is protected
by the discretionary function exception); Gary Sheet & Tin Employees Federal Credit
Union V. United States, 605 F. Supp. 916, 922 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (finding the regulatory
activity of the National Credit Union Administration is protected by the discretionary
function exception). But see McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303, 306 (8th Cir.
1985) (finding that the Defense Department was not acting as a regulator in failing to
exercise reasonable care to see that contractor took proper safety precautions in manu-
facturing explosive cartridges; thus, the case was distinguishable from Varig and the
Government was not protected by the discretionary function exception).
11 Varig, 467 U.S. at 814. The Court noted that the respondents' contention that
the FAA was negligent in failing to inspect challenged two aspects of the FAA certifi-
cation process. Id. at 819. First, the decision of the FAA to implement a spot-check
system, and second, the application of that system to the particular aircraft involved.
Id. The Court barred both claims under the discretionary function exception, holding in
part that "[wihen an agency determines the extent it will supervise the safety procedures
of private individuals, it is exercising discretionary regulatory authority of the most basic
kind." Id. at 819-20.
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the issues relating to actual inspections negligently performed. 92
Varig's-lack of clarity has led the federal courts to an extremely
broad interpretation of the discretionary function exception as
it applies to acts of regulatory agencies -- including actions of
MSHA inspectors pursuant to the Mine Safety and Health Act. 93
IV. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION APPLIED To
NEGLIGENT INSPECTIONS OF THE MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION
A. Cases Prior to Hylin
The Mine Safety and Health Act9 [hereinafter Mine Safety
Act] was enacted by Congress for the purpose of promoting
92 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. The opinion did not distinguish
the facts of Varig from United Scottish. The Court held that both Varig and United
Scottish involved claims of negligent decisions not to inspect; however, the facts of
United Scottish reveal a negligent inspection. Varg, 467 L.S. at 819-20. This omission
has resulted in confusion. Reviewing courts have subsequently held that almost any act
of regulatory agencies is within the discretionary function exception. See supra note 13.
93 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
- 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982). Section 801 provides:
(a) the first priority and concern of all in the coal or other mining industry
must be the health and safety of its most precious resource-the miner;
(b) deaths and serious injuries from unsafe and unhealthful conditions and
practices in the coal or other mines cause grief and suffering to the miners
and to their families;
(c) there is an urgent need to provide more effective means and measures
for improving the working conditions and practices in the Nation's coal or
other mines in order to prevent death and serious physical harm, and in
order to prevent occupational diseases originating in such mines;
(d) the existence of unsafe and unhealthful conditions and practices in the
Nation's coal or other mines is a serious impediment to the future growth
of the coal or other mining industry and cannot be tolerated;
(e) the operators of such mines with 1he assistance of the miners have the
primary responsibility to prevent the existence of such conditions and
practices in such mines;
(f) the disruption of production and the loss of income to operators and
miners as a result of coal or other mine accidents or occupationally caused
diseases unduly impedes and burdens commerce; and
(g) it is the purpose of this chapter (1) to establish interim mandatory
health and safety standards and to direct the Secretary of Health and
Human Services and the Secretary of Labor to develop and promulgate
improved mandatory health or safety standards to protect the health and
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health and safety standards in the coal mining industry. 95 Under
the Mine Safety Act, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to
develop mandatory safety standards9 that are enforced by
MSHA.Y The primary objective of the Act is the protection of
the miner, 98 and it has been liberally interpreted in order to
effect that purpose. 99
safety of the Nation's coal or other miners; (2) to require that each operator
of a coal or other mine and every miner in such mine comply with such
standards; (3) to cooperate with, and provide assistance to, the States in
the development and enforcement of effective State coal or other mine
health and safety programs; and (4) to improve and expand, in cooperation
with the States and the coal or other mining industry, research and devel-
opment and training programs aimed at preventing coal or other mine
accidents and occupationally caused diseases in the industry.
Id. Section 802 provides:
(a) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Labor or his delegate;
(d) "operator" means any owner, lessee, or other person who operates,
controls, or supervises a coal or other mine or any independent contractor
performing services or construction at such mine;
(f) "person" means any individual, partnership, association, corporation,
firm, subsidiary of a corporation, or other organization;
(g) "miner" means any individual working in a coal or other mine;
() "imminent danger" means the existence of any condition or practice in
a coal or other mine which could reasonably be expected to cause death
or serious physical harm before such condition or practice can be abated;
(n)'"Administration" means the Mine Safety and Health Administration in
the Department of Labor.
Id. Section 803 provides: "Each coal or other mine, the products of which enter
commerce, or the operations or products of which affect commerce, and each operator
of such mine, and every miner in such mine shall be subject to the provisions of this
chapter." Id.
91 See Marshall v. Kilgore, 478 F. Supp. 4, 7 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
30 U.S.C. §§ 801(g), 961(a) (1982). For specific procedure followed in developing
the mandatory safety and health standards, see 30 U.S.C. § 811 (1982).
- 30 U.S.C. § 811. The Mine Safety and Health Administration's [hereinafter
MSHA] function is to enforce the mandatory health and safety standards as established
by the Secretary of Labor in the Federal Register. For the established mandatory safety
and health standards, see 30 C.F.R. §§ 56.1-56.20014 (1986) (mandatory safety and
health standards for metal or nonmetal mines); 30 C.F.R. §§ 70.1-70.511 (1986) (man-
datory safety and health standards for underground coal mines).
30 U.S.C. § 801(a); see also 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 3401-516
(discussing legislative history and purpose of the Act).
Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Federal Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 606
F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1979).
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Prior to the court of appeals decision in Hylin v. United
States,'1o federal courts were unwilling to allow an action against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negli-
gent mine inspection and enforcement.10 Federal courts held
that the FTCA merely waives sovereign immunity with reference
to recognized causes of action. 0 2 Thus, under the Mine Safety
Act,103 the United States has no duty in tort unless there exists
an applicable state law under which a private person in similar
circumstances could also be liable.104
Plaintiffs' attorneys made several unsuccessful attempts to
impose liability upon the government for injuries resulting from
the negligent enforcement and implementation of mandatory
regulations by federal mine inspectors. 05 One theory commonly
advanced was an action in state tort law corresponding to the
1wo Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded,
469 U.S. 807 (1985) rev'd 755 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
0I See Raymer v. United States, 660 F.2d 1136, 1142 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding no
action when inspectors granted extension to coal company in order to correct violation
but subsequently failed to follow up on extension and continued violation resulted in
miner's death); Russell v. United States, 631 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Utah 1983) (finding no
cause of action against the United States for negligent inspection that failed to discover
a faulty cage in mine shaft that severed and fell resulting in miner's death); Carroll v.
United States, 488 F. Supp. 757 (D. Idaho 1980) (finding no cause of action when
inspection failed to reveal defect in mining machine that caused miner's injuries);
McCreary v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Penn. 1980) (held no cause of
action when coal miner lost arm entangled in a negligently maintained conveyer belt
which an earlier inspection had revealed but resulted in no action); Bernitsky v. United
States, 463 F. Supp. 1121, 1123 (E.D. Penn. 1979) (held no cause of action when
inspection failed to discover an unguarded tailpiece resulting in miner's death); Mercer
v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (held no action when inspection
failed to reveal violations of mandatory safety standards that resulted in miner's death);
Mosley v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (finding no cause of action
when inspectors followed improper mandatory procedures that resulted in miner's death).
But see Barnson v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 614, 622 (D. Utah 1982) (finding that
plaintiff had a valid cause of action when a negligent inspection of a uranium mine
resulted in radiation exposure that caused the death of several miners).
1o Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43 (1952); Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135, 142 (1950); accord United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976).
,30 Legislative history does not indicate that the Mine Safety and Health Act was
intended to create a private cause of action. See 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
3401-516. Hence, federal courts have refused to recognize an implied right of private
action under the Act. See Carroll, 488 F. Supp. at 759; McCreary, 488 F. Supp. at 539;
Bernitsky, 463 F. Supp. at 1121; Mosley, 456 F. Supp. at 673.
11 E.g., McCreary, 488 F. Supp. at 539-40.
105 See supra note 101.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 324A.'0 6 Section 324A
incorporates three theories: assumption of duty, 10 7 reliance, 08
and increase in the risk of harm. l°9 Cases based on the assump-
tion of duty and reliance theories were unsuccessful because
both theories require a pre-existing duty or reliance." 0 Several
federal cases had alluded to the applicability of the increase in
the risk of harm theory, but found that the facts of the particular
case at hand did not meet the requirements."' Hylin was the
first case to hold that a valid cause of action existed under this
theory. 112
The significance of the cases decided before Hylin lies not
in the holdings precluding governmental liability but rather in
the rationale used to reach that conclusion. In actions premised
on negligent enforcement of the Mine Safety Act's standards,
federal courts have held for the government because the plain-
tiffs could not establish a legitimate state tort claim recognizing
a cause of action."3 The courts indicated an unwillingness to
1o Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a
third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.
Id. at 324A(b).
,o Id. at 324A(c).
1o9 Id. at 324A(a).
1o E.g., Hylin, 715 F.2d at 1212.
" Id.; Raymer v. United States, 606 F.2d 1136, 1143 (6th Cir. 1981); Clemente v.
United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1145 (1st Cir. 1978); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.
Supp. 1160, 1197 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
22 Hylin, 715 F.2d at 1206. The plaintiff alleged that the "inspectors failed to
exercise reasonable care in ordering the erection of the handrail, thus increasing the
likelihood of electrocution .... ." Id. at 1211. In the Seventh Circuit's initial ruling,
the court held that a valid cause of action existed under Section 324A, as adopted by
the Illinois Court in Pippen v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979). Id. at
1212.
... See supra note 101.
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stretch tort doctrines to create government liability.'1 4 However,
the courts did not refuse to recognize liability simply because
the mine inspectors were part of a regulatory agency." 5
B. Critical Analysis of Hylin
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Hylin deci-
sion."16 The Seventh Circuit reconsidered the case pursuant to
the Varig directive and reversed its previous holding." 7 The court
concluded from Varig that the discretionary function exception
protects all negligence of regulatory agencies exercising any dis-
cretion while performing regulatory inspection and enforcement
activities." 8 Therefore, since mine inspectors exercise discretion
in fulfilling their inspection and enforcement duties, the discre-
tionary function exception bars tort claims based upon those
performances." 19 Consequently, the court held that the inspection
and enforcement duties carried out in Hylin were of the requisite
discretion come within the exception. 1
2 0
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Varig and the scope
of the discretionary function exception goes too far. In Varig,
the Court expressed a concern about whether the challenged act
under the FTCA was of the nature and quality that Congress
intended to shield from tort liability.' 21 Furthermore, the Court
" Actions based on the FTCA were meant to be limited by state tort law doctrines.
See supra note 20. When Congress enacted the FTCA it probably did not foresee the
continued liberalization of state tort law theories. Cf Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 801
(1971) ("Congress in considering the Federal Tort Claims Act cannot realistically be said
to have dealt in terms of either the jurisprudential distinctions peculiar to the forms of
action at common law or the metaphysical subtleties that crop up in even contemporary
discussions of tort theory.").
"I See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Hylin, 469 U.S. 807 (1985).
Hylin, 755 F.2d at 554 (1985).
18 Id. at 553.
I' /d. at 554.
12o Id. The court noted that the discretion exercised by MESA was significantly less
than under the FAA. Id. However, the activities of the MESA inspectors still rose to
the level of discretion necessary for the exception. Id. For example, the court stated:
"Although the issuance of the citation is 'nearly automatic,' Hylin, 715 F.2d at 1214,
the inspector is cloaked with the discretion to fix a reasonable time for abatement and,
in some cases, to choose between two means by which the mine operator can abate the
violation." Hylin, 755 F.2d at 554.
121 Varig, 467 U.S. at 813.
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was concerned that special protection should be afforded regu-
latory agencies in order to prevent judicial second guessing of
administrative policy. 122 Although the standard, which the Court
adopted, is unclear, the Court could not have intended to com-
pletely immunize acts of regulatory agencies from judicial review.
The Varig opinion specifically cites the FTCA legislative history
stating that "the common law torts of employees of regulatory
agencies [in a nondiscretionary function], as well as of all other
Federal agencies, would be included within the scope of the bill." 1
2 13
The challenged regulatory action in Varig is distinguishable
from the challenged regulatory action in Hylin. The role of the
FAA is to police the conduct of private individuals by monitor-
ing their compliance with FAA regulations. 124 Monitoring com-
pliance is accomplished through a "spot-check" system where
inspectors are free to decide whether and how thoroughly to
review a given aircraft. 25 Under the FAA system, the individual
inspector must determine the breadth of a given inspection based
on policy judgments regarding the "degree of confidence . . .
in a given manufacturer, the need to maximize compliance with
FAA regulations, and the efficient allocation of agency re-
sources. " 
126
In Varig, the plaintiffs alleged that the FAA was negligent
in failing to inspect certain aspects of the aircraft in the certifi-
cation process. 27 A successful spot-check system requires that
FAA inspectors be allowed to take calculated risks and omit
inspection of certain specific items. '2 The FAA has determined
that these risks are an inevitable consequence of the spot-check
1 Id. at 814.
23 Id. at 810, citing Hearing of H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 33 (1942) (statement of Assistant Attorney
General Francis M. Shea).
" Varig, 467 U.S. at 820.
12 Brief for the United States at 45, United States v. De Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandenses (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984) (Nos. 82-1349 and 82-1350).
,26 Varig, 467 U.S. at 820.
2 Id. at 815.
u Id. at 820. "The inspection process is the central means by which the FAA
discovers violations and thereby enforces its laws, and it is thus crucial that the FAA
be permitted to decide for itself which aircraft to inspect and how extensive that
inspection should be." Brief at 45, Varig (Nos. 82-1349 and 82-1350).
19R71
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system. 129 Hence, the plaintiff's challenge to FAA inspector's
actions in executing the spot-check system necessarily challenges
the FAA's decision to implement that system.130
Unlike the FAA's spot-checking system, MSHA inspectors
have no choice in determining whether to inspect a mine.'
MSHA is required by statute to conduct periodic inspections of
mines subject to the Mine Safety Act. 3 2 The challenged act in
Hylin was the negligent implementation of a federal safety stand-
ard. 1 3 3 The plaintiff was not challenging the promulgation of the
agency's inspection system, but rather the careless implementa-
tion of a particular safety standard that increased the risk of
injury. 3 4 The agency's discretionary decision to establish safety
regulations to protect miners did not involve, either consciously
or by unexpressed assumption, a decision to incur the risk that
the safety standards implemented would increase the risk of
harm to the miners.'35 Increasing the risk of injury to miners is
29 Brief at 44, Varig (Nbs. 82-1349 and 82-1350), citing Harrison and Kolcynski,
Government Liability for Certification of Aircraft? 44 AR L. & COM. 23, 43 (1978).
The United States' brief stated:
Within the regulatory concept of the certification process there may be
endless opportunity for the discovery of error. Yet inherent in the FAA's
regulatory auditing process, which contemplates a review of tests reasonably
necessary to demonstrate compliance with minimum standards, lies the
reality that not all errors and defects can be discovered.
Brief at 44, Varig (Nos. 82-1349 and 82-1350).
130 Varig, 467 U.S. at 819.
30 U.S.C. § 813 (1982). Section 813(a) provides:
Authorized representatives of the Secretary or the Secretary of Health and
Human Services shall make frequent inspections and investigations in coal
or other mines each year . . . the Secretary shall make inspections of each
underground coal or other mine in its entirety at least four times a year,




133 Hylin, 755 F.2d at 553.
134 Id.
133 Inherent in the FAA's spot-check system is the risk that certain defects will not
be discovered. See supra note 129. The plaintiffs in Varig challenged the consequence
of this risk which necessarily represents a challenge to the FAA's decision to implement
the spot-check system. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. MESA's decision to
implement its inspection process, however, did not represent a decision to incur the risk
that the safety standards implemented would increase the risk of harm to the miners.
Hence, in Hylin the plaintiff's challenge of the consequence of this risk does not represent
a challenge of MSHA inspection process.
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not necessary in the careful operation of a mine safety program;
however, the Hylin opinion suggests that MSHA has the discre-
tion to do so.
CONCLUSION
In Hylin v. United States,'3 6 the Seventh Circuit expanded
the protection of the discretionary function exception to all
inspection and enforcement duties of what is now the Mine
Safety and Health Administration.'3 7 The Hylin court reads Varig
as a directive to protect not only MSHA's decision of whether
or not to inspect, but also any negligent act in performing the
inspection. 38 Hylin completely immunizes the acts of MSHA
despite legislative history, specifically cited in Varig, that the
common law torts of regulatory agencies were intended to be
within the scope of the FTCA.13 9
The Hylin opinion sets clear precedent that future acts of
MSHA pursuant to the Mine Safety and Health Act are pro-
tected from private tort action.'14 In light of this broad impli-
cation, an action by the Mine Safety and Health Administration
' 755 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1985).
17 Id. at 554. Hylin actually expanded the discretionary function exception for
actions of MESA and not MSHA. Mine inspections, however, are currently performed
by MSHA pursuant to the Mine Safety Act, and federal courts have held that Hylin
applies to inspections under the current act. See infra note 136.
3 But see Valley Towing Service v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Mo.
1985). In Valley, the court held that the Coast Guard's method of policing compliance
of its policy was under the discretionary function exception. Id. at 299. However, in
dictum, the court stated a contrary view to the Hylin position: "it is clear that the
discretionary function exception applies to the Government's decision whether or not to
erect navigational aids or warnings . . . . Once the decision to construct such aids or
warnings has been made, however, the Government can be liable for negligently main-
taining its structures." Id. at 301.
'' Varig, 467 U.S. at 810.
,, The Hylin decision has been followed in actions premised on alleged negligence
of MSHA inspections. See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 763 F.2d 786, 787 (10th Cir.
1985) (finding that Hylin controls and that a negligent inspection which was the proxi-
mate cause of a fall and subsequent death of a miner was within the discretionary
function exception); Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 610 F. Supp. 86, 89 (D.C. Colo. 1985)
(holding that Hylin controls and that actions of a MHSA inspector who negligently
directed the installation of electrical components which caused explosion resulting in
fifteen deaths was within the discretionary function exception).
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that would give rise to a cause of action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act is difficult to imagine.
Patrick G. Byrne
